A case for CSR and MAT levies on imports.

A case for MAT and CSR levies on imports

V Kumaraswamy

Sec 135 of the Companies Act 2013, enjoins companies meeting some criteria to spend at least 2 % of their average (of preceding 3 years) PAT on social projects. These thresholds are quite low, less than a $ million in PAT or $ 150 million in Sales or less than half that in Networth. As the table shows the PAT of just the listed firms would have had to spend an estimated Rs 4000 cr on CSR using 2016-17 as surrogate for the base PAT. The actual spends reported on CSR by all firms (listed or otherwise) are about Rs 8500 Crores in 2016 as per MCA website.

Sec 115JB of the Income tax act specifies a Minimum Alternate Tax (which now comes to an effective 21.55% of PAT) The objective of introduction of MAT is to bring into the tax net “zero tax companies” which in spite of having earned substantial book profits and having paid handsome dividends, do not pay any tax due to various tax concessions and incentives provided under the Income-tax Law. MAT is in its 3rd avatar: after 2 attempts in 1980s (both American style of deeming certain % as minimum income to be offered for income tax, irrespective of tax shields) it was reintroduced in 1996-97 and has steadily grown in its significance nullifying several other incentives offered.

It should be noted that of the relevant competing countries for our markets – ASEAN, Japan, S Korea and China – very few have an equivalent tax. None of the ASEAN has anything as draconian as ours. Philippines and Cambodia have MATs (titles Minimum Corporate Income Tax MCIT for short) at 2 and 1% of turnover and Malaysia in a facilitative not extractive (purpose is to do away with procedures and elaborate book keeping etc) way has a minimum Tax on Labuan Offshore entities at 3%. Only S Korea has anything that comes close to India’s but the rates are 10-17% depending on size of profits (17% kicks in at an equivalent of about $ 100 million) and SMEs suffer 7%. All very low compared to India. Most of these economies offer various incentives for investment, trade and business promotion, export promotion, employment creation, development of less developed areas, etc. But none of these including incentives including on exports are offset by a levy like MAT.

India’s MAT design and the rate have more or less nullified all the incentives. In fact, Japan had protested strongly against MAT before and in 2014 praying for at least Japanese companies operating in India to be exempt from MAT.  What one policy and goal of government offers the other policy seeks to nullify that too within the same Act – great policy making indeed!

As its stands our investment incentives are neither focused nor competitive. The cash outflows from both CSR and MAT are peculiar to entities and manufacturers operating within India. However, if the same Indian market is accessed from outside India, the entities behind them suffer no such levies or cash outflows. The ASEAN agreement has reached a stage of fruition and in many segments India has seen steep increases in net imports into India due to inherent cost competitiveness. There are other free trade agreements in various stages of reaching peak effectiveness and newer ones are being negotiated.

As our imports grow – as of now there are signs that this will not abate anytime soon- the base on which the Government can collect MAT and CSR (or cause to spend in activities it directs) will shrink in relative terms if not in absolute terms.

Estimates of Loss: The PAT margins on India’s listed enterprises excluding government entities and finance sector is about 6.5%. Our imports excluding oil, gold, semi-precious stones (which are largely for re-exports) and defence, are about $ 200-210 billion. The estimated (at the same rate as ours) PAT margins on this is about $ 3.2 billion and the MAT and CSR that would have accrued to the government /welfare spends is about Rs 21,700 Crore. (Pl see table attached).

Mat and CSR

On deemed profits on imports this would translate to about 1.54% of import values. An equivalent levy should be imposed and recovered on imports. Imagine an addition of this to the existing margins of 6.4% – it can make a huge difference.


Sure similar entities suffer income tax levies in their home countries. But it is also important to remember that almost all countries provide exemption or even incentives for boosting exports and hence don’t suffer MAT or normal taxes. In several of these countries profits of units located in SEZs is exempt for long periods. And profits on specified products and units (depending on focus products and areas) are exempt for varying lengths of time some extending to 20 years.

MAT and CSR are a net differential on our imports and hence a source of competitive advantage for them. Domestic producers are to that extent at a disadvantage, since their profits are taxed at least at MAT. The government has to study all additional obligations on Indian companies and either impose similar obligations on imports or recover through compensatory mechanisms and create funds and spend on targeted activities.

Indian infrastructure is a huge drag on domestic firms; at least the additional levies should be neutralized.

The Irrelevance of CCI in an Open Economy


Like particles behave unpredictably under zero gravity in Physics, in economics what works well in a closed economy may not work that effectively in an open economy and vice versa.

The current controls over monopolies, anti-competitive practices, abuse of dominant positions and mergers exercised by Competition Commission of India (CCI) seem inappropriate for an open economy.

Somehow, from the days of Joan Robinson whose work on imperfect competition is the basis of such market interventions, lesser prices are taken to mean better consumer welfare in our socialistic mindset. Indian telecom market which has expanded solely based on cheap and cheaper prices is an example of how unremunerative  prices can destroy consumer welfare and lead to shoddy services: you cannot even say ‘I love you’ to your beloved on cellphones these days without 3-4 call drops in between.

As it stands today, India is a considerably more ‘open economy’ and particularly more so since ASEAN-FTA, trade agreements with S Korea and Japan from where virtually most goods are available at zero duty at cheaper import parity prices and from China despite duties.

Most manufactured goods can be freely imported – so how can anyone (or in collusion) control or manipulate prices and fix them beyond import parity prices? Conversely, if the Indian prices are lower despite nil-duty imports, it only signifies domestic industry being competitive – so what’s the grouse anyway. Indian firms would be exporting in such cases.

In an open economy the comparative competitive landscape is not just Indian firms alone but includes other relevant supplying countries say China, ASEAN, Japan, Korea and some others, over which CCI has no control. Controlling only the domestic subset leads to loss of competitiveness. Bangladesh and Vietnam have taken a huge part of our share in Textile trade (the prime reason for bleak domestic employment scenario is textiles, potentially our largest employer) due to scale economies: average firm sizes in BD and Vietnam are 10-20 times that of India’s. In some cases, a single machine or unit in China manufactures what the entire Indian industry manufactures or consumes. Scale is an essential component of efficiency and competitiveness and restrictions on them are self-destructive.

Indian regulators have often gotten into the morals of pricing – the very antithesis of free markets. Indian agri produce markets are the most ‘perfect’ competitive – many tiny producer sellers and many individuals buying: the ideal of any Robinsonian economist. Yet from time to time, Tomato and Onion prices fluctuate like an ECG graph whose needle has come unhinged – much more violently than tractor prices, airline prices, white goods, and electricals. Should the CCI get into controlling Onion and Tomato prices and underlying market practices? These have more impact on the daily lives of more people on the brink than many manufactured goods.

Does collusion work in India. Price is the main driver for most consumer decisions in India. Its not unusual to find a Mercedez buyer  bargain for a free key chain. In markets where demand curves have high elasticity there is very limited scope of manipulating prices by firms: small hikes in prices will drive away lots of customers to alternative products. Competition legislations are relevant more for inelastic demands.

Collusive price hikes would lead to reduction in sales in price sensitive markets. But who would volunteer to take these cuts like Saudi Arabia does for Opec? If demand is weak, most players would want to jostle with others and gain market share. If demand is inelastic and hefty price increases are possible with small cuts in production (very few such examples in India: can washing machine manufacturers cut production by say 5% and achieve 25% price jumps?), will any player cut his volume and watch others make money at his expense? Preposterous.

As economist William Baumal concluded over half a century ago, firms are more guided by sales maximization and other such proxies than profit maximizing in their behavior.

Collusion requires co-operation. Where sly and open evasion of every rule or tax-laws are the norm, gentlemen agreements or voluntary self-controls in India is unthinkable. We are terribly competitive in our behavior: otherwise you won’t see such uncouth queue jumping or impatient driving or ‘one for each day in year’ number of national level political parties. Giving up for greater good is just not in our bloodstream.

The right focus

Why be concerned with B2B transactions when both parties are informed, experienced and likely to behave rationally and not psychologically pressurized? Far more collusive behavior is witnessed in B2C transactions say between a doctor (prescribing tests upon irrelevant tests, refusing an operation unless you pass the ‘show me the money’ tests) drug firms and diagnostic labs or between lawyers, a legal system completely under their thumb and hapless clients. To focus on such B2C transactions would be far more welfare additive. CCI should focus more on beefing up enforcement and delivery of consumer protection laws.

Competition laws should definitely be concerned where the products or services are priced below their variable costs. A society not paying variable costs is wasting resources. Such cases in telecom, power and petroleum pose huge systemic risks to the financial system.  In any case why would an Ola or Uber recover less than variable costs unless it is to drive away competition and start exploiting when others have folded up. Such practices are a matter of larger concern, but don’t seem to merit the attention of our CCI.

Competition laws should not be concerned with products can be imported at zero duties or are being imported in large quantities despite duties or products of discretionary expenditure. Why be concerned with scale or prices of consumer electronics, white goods or cars except to ensure that contractual obligations are adhered to and people are not ‘cheated’. Let the consumer choose to stay away, if they are not satisfied with service – after all it is discretinary.

Competition laws should kick in only when firms reach one-half of ASEAN’s biggest capacity. It can be applicable for life saving drugs or non-discretionary products. Others can be followed up based on surveillance or based on grievance from end users.

There are several areas where there are no market structures or performance of existing ones is poor. The commission should work out structures in those areas (example: market structures for electronic wastes, scrapped automobiles, vehicle parking, rural finance and insurance, Public distribution systems, etc.)

CCI in our open economy context seems more a status symbol pining to belong to economic fashion street.  If Make in India refuses to get up, sub-scale will be one key reason and legislations like CCI will have a lot to answer for. India badly needs to consolidate and scale up for cost competitiveness.